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Abstract: We develop a method for encoding information in the 
longitudinal component of a focused field. Focused beams display a non-
zero contribution of the electric field in the direction of propagation. 
However, the associated irradiance is very weak and difficult to isolate 
from the transverse part of the beam. For these reasons, the longitudinal 
component of a focused field could be a good choice for encoding and 
securing information. Using the Richards and Wolf formalism we show 
how to encrypt information in the longitudinal domain of the focal area. In 
addition, we use quantum imaging techniques to enhance the security and to 
prevent unauthorized access to the information. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first report on using the longitudinal component of 
the focused fields in optical security. 
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1. Introduction 
Nowadays, highly focused beams are present in numerous research areas and technical 
applications [1–10]. However, to the best of our knowledge no research has been reported in 
the field of optical security [11–13], using focused fields. It is well known that the electric 
field associated to a plane wave is transverse to the direction of propagation. However, in 
general this is not true for converging beams since a non-zero contribution of the electric field 
in the direction of propagation appears. This fact is a consequence of the Maxwell’s 
Equations. Nevertheless, the irradiance of this longitudinal component is small compared to 
the energy associated to the transverse components, even when the beam is focused with a 
high numerical aperture objective lens. In fact, the transverse part of the field completely 
embeds the longitudinal irradiance. Furthermore, it is not possible to isolate the irradiance of 
the longitudinal component by using holographic techniques or by means of polarizers. 
Taking focused fields into account, it seems appropriate to hide and/or secure information in 
the longitudinal component. Thus, focused fields can be used for optical security provided an 
authorized user is able to access the encoded message. Despite the fact that the longitudinal 
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component of the field cannot be easily accessed, the Gauss law provides a mean to 
numerically access the encoded information by using the transverse field distribution. This 
encoding procedure can be used in combination with a variety of optical encryption 
techniques, and providing an extra layer of security. 
In this paper, we describe how to encode information in the longitudinal component of a 
focused field within the framework of the Richardson and Wolf vector propagation theory 
[14]. We demonstrate that the signal can be encrypted to be equivalent to the cypher-text 
obtained using classical Double Random Phase Encryption (DRPE) [15]. Consequently, 
additional improvements with optical security techniques [16–22] could be adapted to be used 
with focused beams. To avoid conventional attacks against the information encrypted in the 
longitudinal component [23–30], the use of quantum imaging techniques is suggested [31–
33]. 
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we summarize basic concepts in vector 
diffraction theory, and in section 3 we introduce a method for encoding information in the 
longitudinal component of a focused field. In section 4, we present how the codification 
technique is adapted for obtaining encrypted signals in the longitudinal domain. Finally, the 
conclusions are presented in section 5. 
2. Review on highly focused beams 
The electric field E at the focal area of a high numerical aperture (NA) microscope lens 
following the sine condition is described by the so-called Richards-Wolf integral [14]: 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )0 2
0 0
( , , ) , exp sin cos exp cos sinr z A ikr ikz d d
θ πϕ θ φ θ ϕ φ θ θ θ φ
∞
= − − E E (1) 
where A is a proportionality constant, k is the wavenumber, r and φ are the polar coordinates 
at the focal plane, θ and φ are the polar and azimuthal angles at the exit pupil and θ0 is the 
semi-aperture angle, i.e. NA = sin θ0. See Fig. 1 for details. E∞ is the field at the Gaussian 
sphere of reference, described as: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ), , .P a bθ φ θ φ φ θ∞ = +1 2E e e  (2) 
This field can also be understood as the vector angular spectrum of plane waves. In Eq. (2), 
P(θ) is the so-called apodization function; in particular, for isoplanatic optical systems 
following the sine condition ( ) cosP θ θ= ; e1 and ei2 are unit vectors in the radial and 
azimuthal directions, and e2 is the projection of ei2 on the convergent wave-front surface: 
 
( )
( )
( )
2
( sin ,cos ,0)
(cos ,sin ,0)
, (cos cos ,cos sin ,sin ).
φ φ φ
φ φ φ
φ θ θ φ θ φ θ
= −
=
=
1
i
2
e
e
e
 (3) 
The wave-front vector s is defined as: 
 ( )( , , ) sin cos ,sin sin , cos .α β γ θ φ θ φ θ= = −s  (4) 
Here, e1, e2 and s form a triad of a mutually orthogonal right-handed system of unit vectors. 
Note that E∞ is normal to the wavefront vector s, that is s · E∞ = 0. Distributions a and b are 
the azimuthal and radial parts of input field E0 assumed transverse E0 = (E0x, E0y, 0): 
 
0 0
0 0
sin cos
cos sin .
x y
x y
a E E
b E E
φ φ
φ φ
= ⋅ = − +
= ⋅ = +
0 1
i
0 2
E e
E e
 (5) 
The Richards-Wolf integral can be rewritten in a more compact way by using Fourier 
transforms. The first exponential term in Eq. (1) is developed as follows: 
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 ( )( ) ( )2exp sin cos expikr i x yπθ ϕ φ α βλ
 
− = +    (6) 
where x = r cosφ and y = r sinφ are the rectangular coordinates at the focal plane, and λ is the 
wavelength of the illumination source. Let (x∞, y∞, z∞) be the coordinates of a point on the 
Gaussian sphere of reference. According to Fig. 1, x∞ = fα and y∞ = fβ, 
and ( ) ( )2 2exp expi x y i x x y y
f
π π
α βλ λ ∞ ∞
  
+ = +     
, where f is the focal length of the 
objective lens. In addition, surface differentials are related by 2
1sin
cos
d d dx dy
f
θ θ φ
θ ∞ ∞
=  
(see chapter 3 of reference [34] for details). Equation (1) at z = 0 becomes: 
 
( ) ( )( )
( , ,0) FT FT ,
cos cosf f
x y λ λθ θ
∞
 
⋅ + ⋅   = =      
ι
0 1 1 0 2 2E e e E e eEE  (7) 
where operator FTλf[] stands for the λf–scaled Fourier transform. 
 
Fig. 1. Notation and coordinate systems at the Gaussian reference sphere and at the focal plane. 
It is worth to point out that even though the incident beam E0 is assumed to be purely 
transverse, the electric field at the focal plane E(x,y,0) shows a non-negligible longitudinal 
component Ez . Thus, the polarization has to be described as a 3D phenomenon. The radial 
part of E∞ generates the longitudinal component of the focused field since vector e2 is not 
transverse. On the other hand, an azimuthal beam with b = 0 produces a purely transverse 
focused field, i.e. with a longitudinal component Ez = 0. 
3. Information encoding 
A remarkable property of focused fields is the irradiance associated to the longitudinal 
component Iz 
 2 .z zI E dxdy=   (8) 
This longitudinal component is very small compared with the irradiance of the total field E: 
 ( )22 2 .T x y z x y zI I I I E E E dxdy= + + = + +  (9) 
For instance, for a circularly polarized input beam used in combination with an objective lens 
NA = 0.9, Iz ≈0.003IT [35]. The z-component of the focal electric field cannot be separated 
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from the other two components using linear polarizers and/or holographic recording. Thus, it 
cannot be accessed by direct observation using conventional optical equipment. For this 
reason, the use of highly focused fields in optical security enables the possibility to securely 
encode information in the longitudinal component Ez. Since the energy associated with the 
longitudinal component is very weak, the information is embedded by the transverse part of 
the focused field. This encoding approach can be understood as a way of implementing 
steganography using the physical properties of focused light beams. 
According to Eqs. (2) and (3), the longitudinal component of the vector angular spectrum 
reads: 
 ( ) ( )0 0cos sin cos sin cos cos sin sin ..z x yE b E Eθ θ θ θ θ φ φ θ∞ = = ⋅ = +i0 2E e (10) 
The longitudinal or z-component of the focused field is obtained using Eq. (7): 
 ( )0 0 sin( , ,0) FT FT cos sin .cos coszz f f x y
EE x y E Eλ λ
θφ φ
θ θ
∞
  
= = +       (11) 
This equation provides a simple relationship between the longitudinal component of the 
focused field Ez and the input beam E0. Equivalently, 
 [ ]10 0 coscos sin FT ( , ,0) .sinx y f zE E E x yλ
θφ φ
θ
−+ =  (12) 
Depending on how the system is illuminated, E∞z is described differently. For instance, if the 
input beam is circularly polarized E0 = (E0, iE0, 0), then 0 cos sin exp( )zE E iθ θ φ∞ = and 
 ( ) [ ] ( )10 0cos sinexp FT , FT exp .sin cosf z z fE i E E i Eλ λ
θ θφ φ
θ θ
−
 
= − =      (13) 
Alternatively, if the system is illuminated with a radially polarized beam, then E0 = (E0 cosφ, 
E0 sinφ, 0) then 0 cos sinzE E θ θ∞ = . In this case 
 [ ]10 0cos sinFT , FT .sin cosf z z fE E E Eλ λ
θ θ
θ θ
−
 
= =      (14) 
Interestingly, azimuthally polarized beams, that is E0 = (-E0 sinφ, E0 cosφ, 0), produce purely 
transverse distributions of light at the focal plane, i.e. E∞z = 0. This means that this 
polarization cannot be used since no longitudinal component is generated. 
Despite the fact that Iz is very weak compared with the total irradiance of the focused field 
and Ez cannot be isolated from the transverse part of the beam, the longitudinal component 
can be accessed using the condition s · E∞ = 0, or 0x y zE E Eα β γ∞ ∞ ∞+ + =  
with 2 21γ α β= − − − . Then, the longitudinal component Ez can be deduced from: 
 
[ ]1 1
2 2
FT FT
FT .
1
f x f y
z f
E E
E λ λλ
α β
α β
− −  +   =  
− − 
 (15) 
Because the transverse components of the focused field Ex and Ey can be determined 
experimentally (see section 4), Eq. (15) indicates a practical way to estimate the component 
Ez. 
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4. Encryption and validation 
In the previous section, we have demonstrated a method for encoding information in the 
longitudinal field of a highly focused beam. Among the different possibilities for encrypting 
information in the longitudinal component Ez using the present approach, we have selected 
the simplest one. Let M1 and M2 random phase masks (keys), and t the plain-text to be 
encoded [Fig. 2]. Using circularly polarized light [Eq. (13)], the encrypted components of the 
input beam E’0x and E’0y are: 
 ( ) [ ]0 2 1 0 0cos' exp FT , ' ' .sinx f y xE i M M t E iEλ
θφ
θ
= − =   (16) 
Interestingly, in this case the generated cypher-text E’z is identical to the one obtained with 
the classical double random phase encryption procedure (DRPE) [15,16]: 
 ( ) [ ]' 0 2 1sinFT exp ' FT FT .cosz f x f fE i E M M tλ λ λ
θφ
θ
   = =      (17) 
As indicated in Eq. (15) and (16), t can be determined from the information contained in the 
focused encoded components E’x and E’y, provided M2 is known. 
 
[ ]1 11 1
2 2 2
FT ' FT '
FT .
1
f x f y
f
E E
t M λ λλ
α β
α β
− −
− −
  +   =  
− − 
 (18) 
Note that the present encoding system shares the same weakness of the DRPE method. 
Despite the fact that a plurality of attacks have been designed to break DRPE systems [23–
30], different approaches were suggested to improved security in DRPE. For instance, it has 
been demonstrated that quantum encryption systems that works with few photons are very 
secure [31,32]. In this case, the encrypted signal is no longer accessible but it can be 
authenticated. Moreover, note that other non-linear encryption procedures can be 
implemented in the longitudinal domain as well. 
If a system works in low light illumination conditions, irradiance is recorded according to 
the photon-counting model. It is assumed that, in these conditions the image is statistically 
modeled by the Poisson distribution [36]. The photon-counting binary version |E’x|ph of |E’x| is 
obtained according to: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )' 0, if rand , exp ,,
1, otherwise
ph p
x
x y n x y
E x y
 ≤ −
= 
   
 
                             
 (19) 
where rand(x, y) is a uniformly distributed random number within the range [0,1], NP is the 
predetermined number of photon counts in the entire scene, NxM is the total number of pixels 
and np(x,y) is the normalized irradiance at pixel (x, y): 
 ( ) ( )
( )
2'
, 2'
, 1
,
,
,
p x
p N M
x
n m
N E x y
n x y
E n m
=
=

 (20) 
m and n are the summation indices and |E’y|ph is generated using the same approach. The 
encrypted signal uses the photon-counting version of E’x and E’y but the phase remains the 
same: 
 
''
' ' ' '
'
and .
ph ph yph phx
x x y y
yx
EE
E E E E
EE
= =   (21) 
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Finally, tph is estimated by means of Eq. (18). To determine whether tph contains information 
related with t or not, the correlation coefficient ρ calculated at pixel (x,y) is: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
,
, 1
2 2, ,
, 1 , 1
, ,
, ,
, ,
N M ph ph
n m
N M N Mph ph
n m n m
t m x n y t t m n t
x y
t m n t t m n t
ρ =
= =
 + + −  −   
=
 
−  −   

 
  (22) 
where pht  and t  are respectively the mean values of tph and t. 
The presented encryption procedure could be implemented in practice using an optical 
setup able to generate highly focused fields using only conventional components. To provide 
more insight, we suggest a possible design for a practical implementation. This system is 
sketched in Fig. 2(a). First, image t is phase-encoded using a random code such as a diffuser 
(mask M1) and illuminated by a circularly polarized coherent source. The set M1t is located in 
the front focal plane of lens L1. This distribution is optically Fourier transformed using lens 
L1. A transmission type modulator is placed in the back focal plane of L1. Half-wave plate 
HWP and quarter-wave plate QWP are used to set up a twisted nematic modulator in order to 
achieve a phase-mostly configuration. Using Arrizon’s cell-oriented codification method [37], 
it is possible to achieve full complex modulation: a certain value in the complex plane can be 
accessed as a combination of two points that belong to the modulation curve. A detailed 
explanation of the implementation of this procedure can be found in references [38,39]. This 
device displays hologram H containing the following information 
 ( ) 2cosexp .sinH i M
θφ
θ
= −  (23) 
The SLM plane is imaged on the entrance pupil plane of the microscope objective using 
lenses LA and LB in a 4f configuration. The spatial filter in the back focal plane of lens LA is 
required to remove non-desired high order terms produced during the codification. 
Interestingly, the informative part of the beam is propagated on axis. Then, the field E’x is 
focused by means of an objective lens and the transverse part of field is recorded by a CCD 
camera. In order to preserve the phase of the encrypted field, the interference between the 
field E’x and a reference beam is recorded. E’y is accessed in a similar way, by rotating 90° 
polarizer LP. Using encrypted components E’x, and E’y, and the correct mask M2, plain-text t 
can be numerically accessed with the help of Eq. (18). 
 
Fig. 2. (a) Optical setup to implement for the proposed encryption procedure: L1: Fourier lens; 
LA and LB: relay optics lenses; f1, fA, fB and f2 are the focal lengths of lenses L1, LA, LB and the 
microscope objective respectively; SLM: spatial light modulator; HWP and QWP: half and 
quarter wave plates; LP: linear polarizer; CCD: camera. 
Note that misalignment is a very serious problem that can jeopardize the encryption 
procedure. Since the matching procedure can be a laborious task, instead of using lens L1 to 
produce the Fourier transform of the input signal, distribution H FT[M1 t] can be displayed 
directly on the SLM, being lens L1 no longer necessary. 
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5. Numerical tests 
Some calculations were carried out to demonstrate how the system works. A 512x512 pixels 
image of Lena is used as the plaintext t to be encoded in the longitudinal domain Ez. Figure 3 
displays |E’x|2 and |E’z|2. Note that |E’x|2 = |E’y|2 whereas |E’z|2 is a random distribution. 
 
Fig. 3. Encrypted components: (a) |E’x|2 and (b) |E’z|2. 
Figure 4 shows photon counting versions of |E’x|ph, |E’y|ph. NP is set to 10% of the pixels of 
the image. 
 
Fig. 4. Photon counting encrypted components: (a) |E’x|ph, (b) |E’y|ph. 
Figs. 5(a) and 5(b) show the recovered signals t and tph. Correlation ρ when the correct key 
mask M2 and an incorrect key mask M2 are used are presented in Figs. 5(c) and 5(d). As 
expected, tph does not provide any visual information of the plain-text image, but correlation ρ 
between tph and t shows a clear peak when the proper key mask is used. Figures 5(e) and 5(f) 
display correlation ρ with the true and false phase masks but using a higher number of 
photons (NP = 0.15 photons/pixel). 
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Fig. 5. Recovered signals using the correct key M2: (a) decrypted plaintext t (b) photon-
counting decrypted plaintext tph, (c) correlation signal ρ using the correct key M2 and NP = 0.1 
photons/pixel, (d) ρ using an incorrect key M2 and NP = 0.1 photons/pixel, (e) correlation 
signal ρ using the correct key M2 and NP = 0.15 photons/pixel, (f) ρ using an incorrect key M2 
and NP = 0.15 photons/pixel. 
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